

\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

OP IMMED

#2653 1371744

25X1

O 171639Z MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

WH41383

25X1

TOHAK228

PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

MAY 17, 1974

State Dept. review completed

FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT CALLED JUST AFTER WE TALKED. HE HAD NOT YET SEEN YOUR LATEST REPORT AND ASKED HOW YOU WERE DOING AND WHEN YOU WOULD BE COMING HOME. I OUTLINED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS YOUR REPORT AND TOLD HIM THE VERY EARLIEST YOU COULD BE BACK WAS LATE SUNDAY NIGHT. HE MADE NO MENTION OF YOUR COMING TO KEY BISCAYNE AND I DID NOT THINK THIS WAS THE TIME TO RAISE THE ISSUE MYSELF. I THINK THAT AS THE FACT THAT YOU WILL NOT BE BACK BEFORE LATE SUNDAY IS ABSORBED, IT WILL BECOME RELATIVELY EASY TO TURN OFF THE SUGGESTION THAT YOU GO DOWN THERE. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED IN A RELAXED MOOD. HE SPOKE VERY WARMLY OF YOUR EFFORTS AND SAID WHAT A SHAME IT WAS FOR YOU TO HAVE PUT IN ALL THIS WORK, TO HAVE GOTTEN SO CLOSE, AND THEN PERHAPS NOT TO BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THAT LAST BIT. HE THEN VOICED CONCERN THAT IF AGREEMENT WERE NOT REACHED THE ATMOSPHERE COULD WELL DETERIOATE AFTER YOU LEFT. HE ASKED THAT I SEND YOU, "A PAT ON THE BACK FOR HIS (YOUR) HERCULEAN EFFORTS."

MORI/CDF  
C03345570 pages  
1-2

EVERYTHING IS VERY QUIET HERE TODAY. THERE WAS, OF COURSE, NO STAFF MEETING.

I HAVE SENT YOU SEPARATELY THE TEXT OF A RESTON ARTICLE, "MR. NIXON'S NEGLECTED CABINET." THERE IS A VEILED IMPLICATION IN IT THAT AT SOME POINT A HIGHER LOYALTY MAY LEAD YOU TO RESIGN. THERE IS ALSO ONE TROUBLESOME SENTENCE WHERE RESTON SAYS, "ONE SUSPECTS HE (YOU) MAY EVEN BE PROLONGING HIS (YOUR)

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

MC FARLANE, SEC FLE

PSN:044671

PAGE 01

TOR:137/17:17Z

DTG:171639Z MAY 74

\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ORDER TO AVOID EVEN MORE  
COMPLICATED AND POISONOUS CONTROVERSIES OF WASHINGTON."  
NOT VERY HELPFUL FROM A SUPPOSED GOOD FRIEND.

A BARRY SCHWEID TICKER JUST CAME IN WHICH SAYS THAT WHILE YOU  
ARE MEETING WITH ISRAELI LEADERS YOUR AIDES HAVE ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED  
THAT YOU WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO WORK OUT A DISENGAGEMENT THIS  
WEEKEND.

WARM REGARDS.

366

PSN:044671

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:137/17:17Z

DTG:171639Z MAY 74

\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAK TO

99

May 16, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

Please pass the following message to the President:

1. It is clear from my four hour discussion today with Mrs. Meir and her Cabinet and eight hours of talk with Asad that neither side wants to break off the talks; indeed, whenever a recess is mentioned, they plead with me to perservere. At the same time, while there has been some give by each side, it has not been enough to bridge the remaining gap.

2. Based on my informal consultations with various Israeli ministers and in conversation alone with Mrs. Meir, I was encouraged to introduce some new proposal of my own even though the Israeli Cabinet had not been able to come to any agreement in a formal way on modifying its position.

3. I therefore put the following proposal to Asad today making it clear that it was an American proposal and reflected my judgment of what might be possible to achieve with the Israelis. I said to him I thought there was a chance of getting something along the following lines if he were in position to accept:

2. secret/sensitive

a. The line around Kuneitra would move about 200 meters west with the distance between this line and the western hills (about one and a half kilometers) demilitarized under UN supervision .

b. The hills themselves would be under Israeli control with strict limitations on their military dispositions which the United States would guarantee bilaterally to Syria.

c. The Israeli line of ~~xxxxx~~ control would be moved one kilometer back to the north and south of Kuneitra so as to meet Asad's concern about returning civilian population to Kuneitra while the city was enclosed too closely on three sides by Israeli forces.

4. While doing everything possible to prevent a break in the talks, Asad nevertheless continued to insist that at a minimum the line of control should run along the ridge of the hills west of Kuneitra, with UN observers on top and Israeli and Syrians in control of the western and eastern slopes respectively. He later modified this ~~y~~ somewhat by saying that the western side of the hill could be Israeli, the eastern side under the UN as well as the slope, and he added that neither Israelis nor Syrians should be expected to cultivate the ~~xxx~~ fields between the western hills and the outer edge of Kuneitra.

5. My judgement is that there is a chance that I might prevail on the Israelis to accept my proposal but there is little or no chance that the Israelis will accept Asad's formulation.

3.

6. I will spend all day Friday discussing the matter with the Israelis who undoubtedly will have to convene another Cabinet meeting. I will then take whatever I get to Damascus on Saturday with possibility of agreement on my proposal but more likely a suspension of talks for a few weeks.

7. While I naturally would like very much to get agreement on the line and then make an all out effort over the next few days to get agreement on all other related matters, I am convinced that even if there is a suspension we will have gained great ground in our overall Syrian-American relationships, and have preserved our position in the Arab world without affecting adversely our relationships with Israel.

8. I could stay over a few more days if there is a real prospect for an agreement. Otherwise, I will overnight Saturday in Cairo and be back in Washington Sunday evening.

END MESSAGE.

Warm regards.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAKTO \_\_\_\_\_

May 16, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SECRETARY

Please pass the following message to the President:

1. It is clear from my four hour discussion today with Mrs. Meir and her Cabinet and eight hours of talk with Asad that neither side wants to break off the talks. At the same time, while there has been some give by each side, it has not been enough to bridge the remaining gap.

2. Based on my informal consultations with various Israeli ministers and in conversation alone with Mrs. Meir, I was encouraged to introduce some new proposal of my own even though the Israeli Cabinet had not been able to come to any agreement in a formal way on modifying its position.

3. I therefore put the following proposal to Asad today making it clear that it was an American proposal and reflected my judgment of what might be possible to achieve with the Israelis. I said to him I thought there was a chance of getting something along the following lines if he were in position to accept.

*Indeed whenever a  
man is mentioned  
they plead with me  
to persevere.*

3.

6. I will spend all day Friday discussing the matter with the Israelis who undoubtedly will have to convene another Cabinet ~~meeting~~ meeting. I will then take whatever I get to Damascus on Saturday with the ~~possibility~~ possibility ~~that~~ of agreement on my proposal but more likely a suspension of talks for a few weeks.

7. While I naturally would like very much to get agreement on the line and then make an all out ~~my~~ effort over the next few days to get agreement on all other related matters, I am convinced that even if there is a suspension we will have gained great ground in our overall Syrian-American relationships, ~~and~~ *have preserved our position in the Arab world* without affecting adversely our relationships with Israel.

8. I could stay over a few more days if there is a real prospect for an agreement. Otherwise, I will overnight Saturday in Cairo and be back in Washington Sunday evening.

END MESSAGE.

Warm regards.